i.e., Dred Scott v John Sanford (1857) changed by the Thirteenth Amendment (XIIV) amendment passed by the Senate on April 8, 1864, by the House of Representatives on January 31, 1865, and ratified by the required 27 of the then 36 states on December 6, 1865, and proclaimed on December 18, or through the political process of appointments by the executive branch to the SCOTUS of justices with changed political philosophies over time, i.e., Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) ------[Truman, FDR, Eisenhower]---> Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Certainly, I hope that you would not be in favor of being limited by stare decisis in preventing the overturning of Dred Scott or Plessy.
“Settled law” appears frequently in judicial opinions—sometimes to refer to binding precedent, sometimes to denote precedent that has acquired a more mystical permanence, and sometimes as a substantive part of legal doctrine. During judicial confirmation hearings, the term is bandied about as Senators, advocacy groups, and nominees discuss judicial philosophy and deeper ideological commitments. But its varying and often contradictory uses have given rise to a concern that settled law is simply a repository for hopelessly disparate ideas. Without definitional precision, it risks becoming nothing more than empty jargon. Even those who contend that settled law is actually a meaningful concept, admit it does not embody any single, unified idea.
Hope this helps.